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Hierarchy, Coercion, and Exploitation:
An Experimental Analysis
Nikos Nikiforakis, Jörg Oechssler, and Anwar Shahy
Abstract
The power to coerce workers is important for the e¢ cient operation of hierarchically structured
organizations. However, this power can also be used by managers to exploit their subordinates
for their own benet. We examine the relationship between the power to coerce and exploitation
in a laboratory experiment where a senior and a junior player interact repeatedly for a nite
number of periods. We nd that senior players try repeatedly to use their power to exploit junior
workers. These attempts are successful only when junior workers have incomplete information
about how their e¤ort impacts on the earnings of senior players, but not when they have complete
information. Evidence from an incentive-compatible questionnaire indicates that the social
acceptability of exploitation depends on whether the junior worker can detect she is being
exploited. We also show how a history of exploitation a¤ects future interactions.
JEL codes: C91, C72, D74.
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1 Introduction
Hierarchy is a nearly ubiquitous form of organization. Large multinational rms, small businesses,
governmental agencies, and political parties are all hierarchically structured to some degree. A
hierarchy typically implies that some individuals have the power to issue orders to others and
punish those that disobey them. The power to coerce subordinates into taking specic actions
is regarded as essential for the e¢ cient operation of hierarchically structured organizations (e.g.,
Coleman, 1990; Day, 1963). However, individuals higher up in the hierarchy can abuse this power
to their own benet and exploit subordinates (e.g., Vafaï, 2002; Wertheimer, 1987).
The extent of exploitation in organizations is not precisely known. According to the European
Values Survey, 50.2 percent of respondents stated that they felt exploited at work, at least some-
times.1 What is known, however, is that the exploitation of workers entails signicant costs not
only for the workers, but also for the organizations. Apart from the signicant litigation costs,
exploitation has been linked to reductions in workersmorale and productivity (Bewley, 1999), and
to an increase in workplace aggression (Baron, Neuman, and Geddes, 1999; Hoad, 1993). The latter
has been estimated to cost more than 1.75 million working days each year in the United States
(Bachman, 1994).
Despite the importance of the topic, empirical evidence on exploitation in organizations is rare.
One reason for this is that exploitation is usually either illegal or socially unacceptable, and thus
hard to observe. Another important reason is that it can be di¢ cult to determine what constitutes
exploitation in daily life. In general, exploitation can be dened as the act of taking unfair advan-
tage of another party (Wertheimer, 1996, 2008).2 However, determining what constitutes unfair
advantageis not always straightforward as this typically depends on the context of an interaction
and the history between the parties involved, which is often unobservable and unveriable.
The paucity of empirical evidence implies that our knowledge regarding di¤erent factors that
may facilitate exploitation is limited. For this reason, in this paper, we present evidence from
a laboratory experiment exploring whether individuals use the power to coerce to exploit their
subordinates to their own benet and whether this depends on the ability of subordinates to detect
that they are being exploited. While the laboratory environment undoubtedly di¤ers in numerous
ways from that in the eld where exploitation occurs, it has the advantage that it allows one to
examine situations where it is easier to establish what constitutes fair treatment of a worker and,
1The question on whether individuals felt exploited in their workplace was only included in the 1981 wave of the
European Values Survey. In the past decade, the number of lawsuits due to labor exploitation has been steadily
increasing (International Labour Organization, 2009).
2More specically, Wertheimer (1996, p.16) denes exploitation as follows: A exploits B when A takes unfair
advantage of B. Taking unfair advantage could be understood in two ways. First, it may refer to some dimension of
the outcome of the exploitative act or transaction, that is, the transaction is substantively unfair, and this, it seems
has two elements: (1) the benet to A and (2) the e¤ect on B. We may say that the benet to A is unfair because
it is wrong for A to benet at all from his act (e.g. by harming B) or because As benet is excessive relative to
the benet to B. Second, to say that A takes unfair advantage of B may imply that A has been able to turn some
characteristic of B or some feature of Bs situation to his or her advantage. We imply that there is some sort of defect
in the process by which the unfair outcome has come about or the formation of the agreement between A and B, for
example, that A has coerced B or defrauded B or has manipulated B.
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thus, what constitutes exploitation. Another advantage of using laboratory experiments is that
they allow one to manipulate the environment to determine which factors may make exploitation
more likely. For similar reasons, laboratory experiments have been previously used to study issues
such as corruption, discrimination, and favoritism for which eld data is also scarce (e.g., Abbink,
2006; Bernhard et al. 2006; Cameron et al. 2009; Castillo and Petrie, 2010).3
Our set up is as follows. A senior worker is placed in charge of a project. He must complete
the project together with a junior worker. For simplicity, we will refer to the senior worker as he
and the junior worker as she. The two workers are equally e¢ cient at work and the more e¤ort
the junior worker exerts on the project, the less e¤ort the senior needs to exert. The senior worker
makes a suggestion about how much e¤ort the junior worker should exert. The junior worker is
not bound by this suggestion and can disobey the senior worker by choosing to exert a di¤erent
level of e¤ort. The senior worker observes the junior workers e¤ort and has the power to punish
her. He can use this power to try to ensure that the junior worker does not work less than he does,
but he can also use it to coerce the junior worker into working more than him. Therefore, our set
up allows us to establish a plausible benchmark for what constitutes fair treatment of the junior
worker and what can be dened as exploitation. Like in most organizations, in our experiment, the
two workers interact repeatedly for a nite number of periods. This implies that senior workers
may have an incentive to invest in coercing the junior worker into exerting unfairly high levels of
e¤ort.
Our aim is to examine whether participants in the role of senior workers attempt to exploit ju-
nior workers, whether junior workers obey senior workers, and whether senior workers punish junior
workers when they disobey their orders. We examine behavior under symmetric information, where
junior workers know when they are exploited, and under asymmetric information, where the junior
workers cannot detect exploitation. In addition, we employ a method developed by Krupka and
Weber (in press) that uses an incentive-compatible questionnaire to elicit participantsnormative
views against exploitation and coercion, and how these views are a¤ected by whether information is
symmetric or asymmetric. Finally, we explore the impact of past exploitation on future outcomes.
Field evidence indicates that (perceived) unfair treatment of a subordinate is associated with ag-
gression against supervisors (e.g., Greenberg and Barling, 1999). In our experiment, after senior
and junior workers have interacted for a nite number of periods, their roles are switched allowing
us to explore how exploited workers behave when they nd themselves in a position of power.
The experimental results indicate that participants in the role of senior workers systematically
attempt to exploit junior workers. These attempts are much more pronounced under asymmetric
information. In line with this behavior, responses to the incentive-compatible questionnaire indicate
that senior workers consider higher-than-fair levels of e¤ort more socially acceptable when there
3Laboratory experiments have also been used repeatedly to study topics in organizational economics. Some
prominent examples are the investigation of gift-exchange relationships between employers and workers (e.g. Fehr,
Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993), the adverse e¤ects of monitoring workers (e.g., Falk and Kosfeld, 2006), factors that
may facilitate coordination within rms (e.g., Brandts and Cooper, 2006; Weber, 2006), factors that may explain
delegation (Hamman, Loewenstein, and Weber, 2010) and the impact of membership in organizational groups (Goette,
Hu¤man, Meier, and Sutter, 2012).
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is asymmetric information. This is presumably because junior workers do not know they are
being exploited. Despite the signicant amounts of punishment in both treatments, exploitation
is not successful under symmetric information as junior workers disobey the suggestions made by
senior workers. Exploitation is successful under asymmetric information, although the extent of
exploitation is small. The reason is that junior workers appear to anticipate that senior workers will
try to exploit their informational advantage and disobey their suggestions. Disobedience is punished
in both treatments, but substantially more under asymmetric information. As a consequence, junior
workers with incomplete information are not only signicantly worse o¤ than senior workers, but
also than junior workers who have complete information. Finally, we nd that junior workers that
have been exploited are more likely to attempt to exploit their subordinates when roles are reversed.
2 The experiment
2.1 The game
To address our research questions, we use a two-player, three-stage game. In stage one, the senior
worker (Player S) makes a nonbinding suggestion, s, regarding the e¤ort level that he would like
the junior worker (Player J) to choose in stage 2. In stage two, Player J is informed about the
level of e¤ort suggested by Player S. Since the suggestion by Player S is nonbinding, Player J may
choose any e¤ort level e 2 f0; 1; :::; 10g. The earnings of Player S are an increasing function of e
while the earnings of Player J are a decreasing function of e. Table 1 shows the pre-punishment
earnings (^i) of both players as a function of Player Js e¤ort.
Table 1: Playersearnings as a function of e¤ort chosen by Player J
e 0 1 2 3x 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
^S 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
^J 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4
Note:  denotes subgame-perfect solution for selfinterested players; x denotes subgame-perfect solution for inequality-
averse (Fehr-Schmidt) players with S > 1=4 (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
In stage three, Player S receives information about the level of e¤ort chosen by Player J and
the associated earnings for both players. Having received this information, Player S can assign
punishment points p 2 N which would reduce Player Js earnings. Reducing Player Js earnings is
costly for Player S who must sacrice 0.2 units for every 1 unit he wishes to reduce Js earnings.
That is, we employ a 1:5 fee-to-ne ratio, which should make punishment even more e¤ective than
usual.4 Player S cannot reduce Player Js earnings below 0, that is, p  ^J . Thus, the nal earnings
of both players at the end of a stage three are given by
4The fee-to-ne ratio was chosen so that punishment poses a non-negligable threat to the junior worker. In most
experiments allowing for explicit punishment opportunities, the fee-to-ne ratio tends to be 1:3 (see e.g., Nikiforakis
and Normann, 2008).
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S = 12 + 2e  0:2p (1)
J = 24  2e  p: (2)
Note that, without punishment, the game is a constant-sum game and e¢ ciency concerns should
play no role. This was done in order to control for subjectsconcerns for e¢ ciency and simplify
the analysis of the data.5 Note also that an e¤ort level of 3 equates the earnings of Player S and
Player J. Given the saliency of equality in previous laboratory experiments and the fact that players
are randomly assigned their roles in the experiment, e = 3 could be regarded as the fair level of
e¤ort.Therefore, in line with Wertheirmers (1996, 2008) denition of exploitation, we will say
that Player S exploits Player J when e > 3. Accordingly, we will say that Player S attempts to
exploit Player J if he suggests that Player J chooses an e¤ort level greater than 3. Finally, we will
say that Player S coerces Player J if the latter disobeys Player S by choosing a lower level of e¤ort
than what was suggested by Player S and Player S punishes her.6
2.2 Experimental treatments
In the experiment, we investigate behavior in two treatment which di¤er with respect to the infor-
mation available to Player J. In the baseline treatment, which we will call SYM, both players have
symmetric information about the earnings functions of both players. In particular, the instructions
contain both rows of Table 1 and formulas (1) and (2). In treatment ASYM (for asymmetric in-
formation), Player S is completely informed about Player Js earnings function. However, Player J
knows only her own earnings function precisely (i.e. equation (1) and the ^Srow are not contained
in Player Js instructions). With respect to Player Ss earnings, Player J knows only that there is a
positive relationship between e and Player Ss earnings. This is common knowledge. Both players
know about the e¤ects and costs of punishment.
Participants in the experiment play the constituent game over 10 periods with the same partner.
Note that the use of a xed-matching protocol makes it possible for the senior to invest in
punishment by punishing heavily in early periods in order to obtain the desired e¤ort level. After
each period, players are informed of their own earnings and how they were determined (i.e., e, p;
but also s).
5This is in line with Tormey (1974) who writes that Exploitation resembles a zero-sum game, viz. what the
exploiter gains, the exploitee loses; or, minimally, for the exploiter to gain, the exploitee must lose.(p.207-208).
6This denition is consistent with that of Wertheimer (1996, p. 26) who states: In general, A coerces B to do X
only if A proposes (threatens) to make B worse o¤ with reference to some baseline condition if B chooses not to do
X, although specifying the appropriate baseline against which to measure the proposal can be a complicated matter.
We take the suggestion of Player S as the baseline.
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2.3 Related experimental literature
The literature on exploitation is vast, mostly philosophical, and spans di¤erent disciplines. A
thorough discussion of this literature is beyond our scope and would require a separate paper. The
interested reader is referred to Wertheimer (1996, 2008). In this section, we review some related
studies that use laboratory experiments.
In some respects, our game is similar to the wellstudied ultimatum game, but with a number of
important di¤erences. The three most important are the following: (1) The non-binding suggestion
in our game makes it possible for Player S to implicitly express a threat of the form If you
dont do as I say, then I will punish you,much like supervisors can in organizations.7 Therefore,
unlike in the ultimatum game, the power to punish can be used not only to prevent unfairly low
levels of e¤ort by Player J, but also to coerce her into exerting unfairly high levels of e¤ort. (2)
Maximal punishment in our game leaves Player S with strictly positive earnings and Player J with
zero earnings a feature we believe is realistic of asymmetric relationships in the workplace and
elsewhere. In contrast, in the ultimatum game, a rejection leaves both parties with zero earnings.
(3) Like in most organizations, players in our experiment interact repeatedly. In contrast, in most
ultimatum game experiments, subjects are randomly rematched in each period, and thus have no
monetary incentive to invest in punishment.
Despite these di¤erences, experiments in ultimatum games provide important insights about
what one might expect to happen in our experiment. First, ultimatum games have established
that the majority of participants in laboratory experiments have an aversion towards being taken
advantage of and are thus willing to reject low o¤ers (see e.g. Camerer, 2003). In anticipation
of this, most o¤ers tend to divide the surplus equally. However, when responders cannot monitor
the fairness of the proposers o¤ers, the latter make low o¤ers relative to when responders can
observe the earnings of both players (Croson, 1996; Kagel, Kim, and Moser, 1996; Güth, Huck,
and Ockenfels, 1996; Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993; Rapoport and Sundali, 1996; Rapoport, Sundali,
and Seale, 1996; Schmitt, 2004; Straub and Murnighan, 1995). In general, responders accept these
o¤ers.
These ndings suggest that participants in the role of Player S may try to exploit Player J. The
latter may resist exploitation when there is symmetric information, but may allowto be exploited
when she lacks information about the earnings of Player S. However, this need not be the case.
First, unlike in our experiment where Player J has no information whatsoever about the earnings
of Player S (in the ASYM treatment), responders in the aforementioned studies, know the possible
realizations of the surplus and the probability distribution. This implies that they can make some
inferences about whether the proposer is trying to exploit his informational advantage. Second,
since the aforementioned ultimatum games do not involve repeated interactions, proposers do not
have an incentive to invest in building a reputation; therefore, their o¤ers reect what they think
responders will accept. In contrast, in our experiment, Player S has an incentive to suggest high
7Suggestions have been also shown to a¤ect behavior even when not backed by a punishment threat. In a recent
experiment, Andreoni and Rao (2011) show that if a receiver in a dictator game can suggest to the sender how much
he should send, sending increases signicantly.
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levels of e¤ort and then punish Player J if they disobey their demands in order to achieve higher
earnings in later rounds even under symmetric information. Our study therefore goes further by
examining not only whether participants in the role of Player S attempt to exploit Player J, but
also whether they are ready to coerce Player J in exerting higher levels of e¤ort, and Player Js
reaction.
Two closely related studies are Boles, Croson, and Murningham (2000) and Croson, Boles, and
Murnighan (2003). These studies allow responders in an ultimatum game who are uninformed about
the pie size to write open-ended messages to proposers, which, as it turns out, often take the form
of threats. While threatsand punishment are also possible in these studies, importantly, unlike
in our game, it is the uninformed party who issues the threat and can punish by rejecting o¤ers.
The two games, therefore, model di¤erent situations. We believe that our set up is more relevant
for understanding exploitation in organizations as managers usually have both more information
than their subordinates and the power to coerce.8 We also note that while these studies also use
xed matching, individuals in Croson et al. and Boles et al. play 4 di¤erent games, each with a
di¤erent pie size. Therefore, an action that may be perceived as selsh in one game, may actually
be generous in another. This is not the case in our experiment where subjects play 10 times the
same game.
The study most closely related to ours is that by Bolle, Breitmoser, and Schlächter (2011) who
study extortion in a laboratory experiment using a nitely-repeated game between two players with
symmetric information. In the rst stage of the game, the rst mover demands part of the other
players endowment. If the second mover accepts the demand in the second stage, then the game
ends. If he rejects it, then the rst mover can punish him. The threat posed by punishment is
formidable. The rst mover has to pay a xed fee for punishing the second mover (25 percent of his
endowment) and can reduce the latters earnings by as much as he wishes. The authors nd that
the majority of demands implement equal earnings for the two players. Also, rst movers are more
likely to use maximal punishment. As a result, the probability their demand is accepted increases
over time even though rst movers become more demanding over the course of the experiment.
There are a number of di¤erences between Bolle et al. (2011) and our study. First, Bolle
et al. study behavior only under symmetric information, and not under asymmetric information.
Second, there is a di¤erence in the initial conditions, which could be important as it may a¤ect
subjectsviews on what they are entitled to, their interpretation of the other players intentions,
and the norms governing behavior.9 Third, the punishment technology in Bolle et al. is much more
severe than in our experiment. At the extreme, the fee-to-ne ratio is 1:16 compared to 1:5 in our
experiment. Finally, we study how a history of exploitation a¤ects the relationship between Player
8Although Boles et al. (1999) and Croson et al. (2003) vary the information conditions, the authors do not explore
how threats and rejections vary across information conditions. In addition, we also study how the information
conditions a¤ect the social acceptability of exploitation.
9 In particular, in Bolle et al. (2011), players are given endowments and the rst mover can try to appropriate some
of the second movers endowment. This is the reason why Bolle et al.s study is one of extortion. In our experiment,
subjects are not given endowments. The rst mover (Player S) simply suggests a level of e¤ort. All else equal, we
would expect second movers in our experiment to be more likely to accept the rst movers demands.
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S and J in future interactions when roles are reversed, and also elicit norms against exploitation
using an incentive-compatible questionnaire, as we discuss below.
2.4 Path dependence
The experiment is divided into three parts. In Part 1, subjects play the game described in section
2.1. We are also interested to examine how past attempts to exploit Player J a¤ect her behavior
in the future. Does Player J retaliate when she has been coerced and exploited by Player S or
does she let bygones be bygones? How does Player S react? This is an interesting question as in
many organizations some young, talented, and energetic employees advance more quickly through
the ranks than others and ultimately nd themselves in a position of relative power.10 For this
purpose, in Part 2 of the experiment, subjectsroles are reversed. Participants are not aware about
the existence of Part 2, until Part 1 is completed.11
Part 2 of the experiment is identical in both treatments SYM and ASYM. That is, players have
symmetric information in both cases. In Part 2, it is common knowledge that participants will play
another 10 periods of the constituent game with their partners from Part 1.
2.5 Norms against exploitation and coercion
In the introduction, we stated our belief that exploitation is often socially unacceptable. Therefore,
it is reasonable to expect that participants behavior may be driven, at least partly, by norms
against exploitation and coercion. To examine whether this is the case, whether participants hold
similar views regarding the moral aspects underlying our game and how these views are a¤ected
by the information available to Player J, we elicit their views on the social acceptability of various
hypothetical choices of e¤ort levels and punishments in the third and nal part of the experiment.
Participants are informed about Part 3 at the end of Part 2 and are told that this would be the
nal part of the experiment.
To elicit social norms against exploitation and coercion, we follow a procedure introduced by
Krupka and Weber (in press).12 Depending on the treatment, each participant is asked to character-
ize the suggestions of a hypothetical Player S (Adam) in Part 1 or the suggestions of a hypothetical
Player J (Bob) in Part 2 as (1) very socially acceptable, (2) somewhat socially acceptable, (3) some-
what socially unacceptable, or (4) very socially unacceptable.13 For example, questions regarding
10This can certainly happen in academia. For example, consider a full professor who wishes to o¤-load a large
undergraduate class to a new assistant professor. Although the suggestion is formally nonbinding, the assistant
professor realizes that various punishment possibilities are available to the senior (e.g. tenure decision). However,
the assistant professor will eventually be promoted and may even become the head of the department which gives
him power over the old professor. While this may take a few years, in other organizations where the age di¤erence
between employees is smaller, the power reversal may happen more quickly.
11The instructions read You may receive further instructions later. If you do, please read those also carefully.
The instructions for Part 2, however, explicitly said that the nal Part 3 contains only a questionnaire.
12This method was also used recently by Burks and Krupka (2012) to investigate ethical norms in di¤erent steps
of the hierarchy in a large nancial services rm. Amongst other things, Burks and Krupka nd that disagreement
in views regarding ethical behavior can explain factors such as job dissatisfaction.
13 In the experimental instructions, participants were told the following with regards to what is meant by socially
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Part 1 are:
Suppose in Part 1, Bob knows exactly how Adams earnings depend on Bobs e¤ort
choice. Adam asked Bob to choose an e¤ort level of (3 or 5). How socially acceptable
is Adams demand?
In the ASYM treatment two additional questions are asked:
Suppose in Part 1, Bob does NOT know how Adams earnings depend on Bobs e¤ort
choice. Adam asked Bob to choose an e¤ort level of (3 or 5). How socially acceptable
is Adams demand?
A question regarding Part 2 is:
In Part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an e¤ort level of 5. Bob chose an e¤ort level of 3.
Adam reduced Bobs earnings until nally Bob chose a level of 5. In Part 2, Bob asked
Adam to choose an e¤ort level of (5 or 7). How socially acceptable is Bobs demand?
Following Krupka and Weber (in press), one of the questions is randomly selected at the end of
the experiment. If a participants answer matches that given by the majority of other participants
in the experimental session, then he receives 5 Australian dollars (AUD) on top of his earnings
from Part 1 and Part 2. If his answer does not match the majority answer, he receives nothing.
The payment scheme provides individuals with incentives to reveal their beliefs about how socially
acceptable a certain action is considered to be by the majority of participants in the experiment.
Since social norms may be dened as shared perceptions, among members of a population regarding
the appropriateness of di¤erent behaviors(Krupka and Weber, in press, p.4), the answers to the
questionnaire should reveal the existence and content of norms against exploitation and coercion.14
The entire list of questions can be found in the appendix.
2.6 Experimental procedures
The experiments was conducted in the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University of
Melbourne between December 2009 and March 2010, using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Two ses-
sions, each with 20 participants, were conducted for each treatment. Each session lasted approx-
imately one hour forty-ve minutes. Participants were invited from a database of approximately
2500 registered volunteer students using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
acceptable. By socially acceptable, we mean decisions that most people would consider acceptable. A decision
would be socially unacceptable if most people would consider it unacceptable.
14Of course, this game has multiple equilibria. The procedure works as intended only if subjects take their true
belief about the majoritys opinion as a focal point.
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Prior to entering the laboratory, each participant drew randomly a number from a hat. The
number determined the participantsseat in the laboratory, their role in Part 1 of the experiment
and their partner the identity of whom was not revealed at any time before or after the experiment.
Participants were then asked to read the instructions for Part 1. After reading the instructions for
Part 1 (and later Part 2) participants completed a control questionnaire to check if they understood
the instructions. Once all participants answers were checked the experiment commenced. The
instructions for Part 2 were distributed at the conclusion of Part 1. Similarly, the instructions of
Part 3 were distributed at the end of Part 2.
Previous studies provide evidence suggesting that participants may behave in a more socially
acceptable way (i.e., not attempt to exploit or coerce their subordinates) if the experimenter can
identify their actions from their earnings (e.g., Ho¤man et al., 1994). In order to minimize possible
experimenter-demand e¤ects, we used a double-blind protocol. One participant was assigned the
role of the monitorbased on the hat draw. The job of the monitor was to pay the participants
at the end of the experiment. The experimenter was not present during the payment. Participants
were told that the monitor would not read the instructions for Part 1 (and later for parts 2 and 3).
Thus, the monitor was completely unaware about the game and could not infer whether participants
behaved in a socially acceptable way; indeed, they could not even infer whether there was such a
dimension to the experiment. The monitor only read a general set of instructions which was also
provided to the other participants.
Earnings from the experiment were in Experimental Monetary Units (EMU) with an exchange
rate of 9 EMU = 1 Australian Dollar (AUD). Average earnings from the experiment amounted to
approximately 40 AUD (or 22.85 AUD per hour). At the time of the experiment, the minimum
national hourly wage rate was 14.31 AUD and the exchange rate between the Australian and the
US Dollar was approximately 1. The monitor received a xed payment of 30 AUD for assistance.
2.7 Behavioral hypotheses
We solve the 10-times repeated game by backward induction for two di¤erent behavioral assump-
tions. Assume rst that it is common knowledge that players are only interested in their own
material payo¤s. Then there will be no punishment on the third stage as punishment reduces the
earnings for Player S (i.e., p = 0). Hence, on the second stage, Player J will choose the minimal
e¤ort of e = 0. On the rst stage, Player S may make any suggestion regarding the desired e¤ort
level since this is only cheap talk. The resulting earnings are S = 12 and J = 24: This predic-
tion holds under both symmetric and asymmetric information (i.e., both in treatments SYM and
ASYM). Since this is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the constituent game, a well-known
result (see e.g. Oechssler, 2013) implies that the 10-period game has a unique subgame-perfect equi-
librium which consists of playing the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the constituent game
in every period.
Let us now assume that players dislike inequality in earnings. In particular, let us assume
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Fehr-Schmidt preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). The utility of player i is given by
ui = i   imax [j  i; 0]  imax [i  j ; 0] ; (3)
with 0  i < 1 and i  i. This model is a natural choice for our purposes as it assumes that
(some) players may dislike being treated unfairly.
As pointed out by Oechssler (2013), when a constituent game is repeated a nite number of
times with social preferences, one cannot rely, in general, on the above result since preferences are
interdependent across periods. This is why we have to use the sum of payo¤s i =
P
t 
t
i in (3).
Consider rst the case of symmetric information. We solve the repeated game by backward
induction. Consider stage 3 of the last period. Given that 5 units of punishment reduce J by 5
and S by 1, the payo¤ di¤erence is being reduced by 4. Hence, if S > 1=4; Player S will use
punishment to reduce as much as possible the inequality in material payo¤s, that is, he will try
to minimize the second term in (3). This implies that there will be no punishment, if payo¤s are
(weakly) in favor of Player S because punishment would only increase the payo¤ di¤erence between
Player S and Player J and would therefore never be used for any S  0. Assuming Player J knows
that S > 1=4 and that she considers her own earnings as more important than that of Player S
(i.e., J < 1=2), her best response on stage 2 is to choose an e¤ort such that payo¤s are as equal
as possible.15 Intuitively, it is better for Player J to equalize payo¤s herself rather than wait for
Player S to equalize payo¤s through punishment. In particular, if earnings so far have been equal,
Player J will choose e = 3. Again, Player S may demand any level of e¤ort in stage 1.
Given this behavior in the last period, one can check that there is a unique set of subgame-
perfect equilibria which has the properties that (1) punishment is not used on the equilibrium path
and (2) both players receive the same payo¤ on the equilibrium path. One of those equilibrium
paths is focal as it involves a constant e¤ort of e = 3 in each period. The resulting earnings in the
constituent game are S = 18 and J = 18: But there are also SPE in which, for example, Player
J chooses e = 2 in one period and makes up for this with e = 4 in another period. However, the
average e¤ort over all 10 periods must be 3.
Under asymmetric information, if Player S is su¢ ciently averse to disadvantageous inequality
(i.e., S > 1=4), having complete information about the earnings of both players, he will punish
Player J to equalize payo¤s: However, Player J has no information about how her e¤ort impacts
the earnings of Player S. Therefore, we cannot o¤er a clear prediction about how asymmetric
information may a¤ect outcomes if players are inequality averse. Based on the evidence discussed
in section 2.3, we expect Player S to be more likely to attempt to exploit Player J in ASYM than
in SYM.
To summarize, both theories predict that average e¤ort is less than or equal to 3: Punishment
is only predicted by the Fehr-Schmidt model when average e¤ort is less than 3 and Player S cares
su¢ ciently about disadvantageous inequality (i.e., S > 1=4). Punishment is predicted to be
15 If Player J is su¢ ciently concerned about inequality in her favor (i.e., J > 1=2), she would choose an e¤ort to
equalize payo¤s without the threat of punishment (i.e. even if S < 1=4).
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Figure 1: Suggestions made by Player S in Part 1
unrelated to the suggestions made by Player S.
3 Results
Result 1: Player S attempts to exploit Player J in both treatments. Attempts to exploit are more
pronounced under asymmetric information.
SUPPORT: Figure 1 presents a histogram with the suggestions made by participants assigned the
role of Player S in the rst part of the experiment (periods 1-10) in each treatment. Suggestions
are visibly higher in ASYM than in SYM. The average (median) suggestion is 4.66 (4) in SYM and
6.35 (6) in ASYM. The modal suggestion is 3 in SYM and 6 in ASYM. The di¤erence is statistically
signicant using the average suggestion across periods 1-10 in each group as an independent obser-
vation (Mann-Whitney, two-tailed, p-value < 0:01). The di¤erence in suggestions is apparent even
in period 1 (4.65 in SYM and 6.20 in ASYM; Mann-Whitney, two-tailed, p-value = 0:03), showing
that participants in the role of Player S understand incentives in the game and that they are willing
to use the informational advantage to their benet. Suggestions remain fairly stable across the ten
periods in Part 1 (Spearman:  =  0:03; p-value = 0:93 for SYM;  =  0:10; p-value = 0:79 for
ASYM).
The data summarized in Figure 1 are somewhat puzzling. On the one hand, they indicate
clearly that most participants in the role of Player S are not concerned much about (advantageous)
inequalities in earnings as they attempt to exploit their informational advantage in ASYM to earn
higher amounts than Player J. On the other hand, however, participants make fairly low suggestions
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under symmetric information, despite the fact that they can coerce Player J into exerting higher
e¤ort. Why is this? One possibility is that subjectsbehavior is a¤ected by social norms related to
exploitation, and that the norms prescribe di¤erent actions under di¤erent information conditions.
Therefore, before we examine the e¤ort exerted by Player J, we take a look at the answers to
the norm questionnaire. What level of e¤ort do individuals in the role of Player S believe to be
socially acceptable and what level to be socially unacceptable? Most participants in the role of
Player S in both treatments nd an e¤ort of 3 (the level that equalizes pre-punishment earnings)
to be very socially acceptable.16 More interestingly, however, is the response to the question how
socially acceptable do those in the role of Player S nd e¤ort levels of 5, which imply ^S > ^J .
The average rank is 2.30 in SYM and 1.45 in ASYM. The di¤erence is statistically signicant
(Mann-Whitney, p-value < 0:01). These responses indicate that those in the role of Player S in
treatment ASYM believe that when exploitation cannot be detected it is less socially unacceptable.
This is presumably because Player J does not feel that she is being exploited. This provides an
explanation for the more frequent attempts to exploit in Part 1 which, to our knowledge, has not
been previously documented in the literature.
Result 2: On average, attempts to exploit are unsuccessful under symmetric information. Player
S succeeds in exploiting Player J under asymmetric information, but the extent of exploitation
is relatively small. Nevertheless, those in the role of Player J are worse o¤ under asymmetric
information than under symmetric information.
SUPPORT: The average (median) e¤ort level is 3.03 (3) in SYM and 3.64 (4) in ASYM (see Figure
2). The di¤erence is (weakly) signicant (Mann-Whitney, two-tailed, p-value = 0:07). Further,
using the average e¤ort level in each group in periods 1-10 as an independent observation, we
fail to reject the hypothesis that the e¤ort level in SYM is signicantly di¤erent from 3, which
would equalize the earnings of Player S and J (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two tailed, p value
= 0:49). Thus, according to our denition, we do not detect exploitation in the SYM treatment.
In contrast, the average e¤ort level in ASYM is signicantly higher than 3 (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, two tailed, p value = 0:03) and documents at least a small level of exploitation. E¤ort levels
remain fairly stable across the ten periods in Part 1 (Spearman:  = 0:20; p-value = 0:59 for SYM;
 =  0:28; p-value = 0:44 for ASYM).
The result of exploitation is that the pre-punishment earnings of senior subjects in the rst part
of the experiment are 19.28 EMU, while that of junior subjects are 16.72 EMU. This di¤erence
is (weakly) statistically signicant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-tailed, p-value = 0:09). The
di¤erence in pre-punishment earnings of senior and junior subjects in SYM is negligible (18.05
EMU and 17.95 EMU for senior and junior subjects, respectively) and not statistically signicant
16The answers were coded as 1 for very socially acceptable, 2 for somewhat socially acceptable, 3 for somewhat
socially unacceptable, and 4 for very socially unacceptable. In particular, all participants in the role of Player
S in treatment SYM said that an e¤ort of 3 is very socially acceptable (average rank = 1). Similarly, 75 percent of
those assigned the role of Player S in ASYM said that an e¤ort of 3 is very socially acceptable while a further 15
percent said that it was somewhat socially acceptable (average rank = 1:35). Despite being small in magnitude, the
di¤erence is statistically signicant (Mann-Whitney, p-value = 0:02).
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Figure 2: E¤ort exerted by Player J in Part 1
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-tailed, p-value = 0:81). The post-punishment earnings of junior
subjects in ASYM (12.41 EMU) are signicantly lower than those of junior subjects in SYM (15.46;
Mann-Whitney, two-tailed, p-value < 0:01).
Result 3: The reason why exploitation is relatively small under asymmetric information is that
those in the role of Player J show more disobedience with respect to the suggestions made by Player
S.
SUPPORT: We dene e¤ort deviation as the di¤erence between the suggestion by Player S and
the e¤ort exerted by Player J. E¤ort deviation is a measure of disobedience.17 The average e¤ort
deviation in periods 1-10 is 1.63 in SYM and 2.72 in ASYM. Using the average of each group
in periods 1-10, we nd that the di¤erence across treatments is statistically signicant (Mann-
Whitney, two-tailed, p-value = 0:04). Those in the role of Player J seem to anticipate that Player S
will attempt to use the asymmetric information to their advantage already in the rst period. The
average e¤ort deviation in period 1 is 1.80 in SYM and 2.55 in ASYM (Mann-Whitney, two-tailed,
p-value = 0:11). Even though suggestions are higher in the ASYM than in the SYM treatment,
Player Js greater willingness to disobey Player S in the ASYM treatment seems surprising, given
that Player J does not have any information about Player Ss earnings.
17As one would expect, e¤ort deviation is almost always positive or zero, i.e., Player J almost never exerts e¤ort
higher than what was suggested to them. In particular, out of 200 observations (20 groups * 10 periods) in the rst
part of the experiment in each treatment, there are only 6 instances of negative e¤ort deviation all of which occurred
in SYM.
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Figure 3: Distribution of punishment points assigned by Player S in Part 1
According to the theoretical predictions discussed in Section 2.7, suggestions (or disobedience)
should not be correlated with punishment. However, as the next result shows, this turns out not
to be the case.
Result 4: In both treatments, Player S coerces Player J by punishing her when she disobeys
his suggestion. Coercion is substantially more severe under asymmetric information, even when
we control for the extent of disobedience. In both treatments, coercion has a relatively small but
positive e¤ect on e¤ort.
SUPPORT: Most participants in the role of Player S use punishment at some point in Part 1. In
particular, 15 of the 20 senior subjects punish at least once in SYM and 18 out of 20 senior subjects
do so in ASYM. The average number of punishment points assigned is larger in ASYM than in
SYM (4.10 versus 2.49). This is a sizeable di¤erence suggesting that participants in ASYM are
willing to coerce those in the role of Player J into exerting higher levels of e¤ort. However, this
may be a premature conclusion if this di¤erence is driven by the greater extent of disobedience in
ASYM (see Result 3).
Figure 3 shows the distribution of punishment points assigned by Player S in Part 1 of the
experiment. In many rounds there is no punishment at all. If there is punishment, it seems to be
fairly spread out over all possible punishment levels with peaks on prominent numbers like 5 and
10. The frequency of maximal punishment is small (1.8% in SYM and 7.0% in ASYM).18
18This is not shown in Figure 3 since maximal punishment depends on the pre-punishment earnings of player J.
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Table 2: What determines punishment? Tobit random e¤ects regression
dependent variable: punishment points SYM ASYM pooled
e¤ort deviation (s  e) 1:60

(0:40)
0:95
(0:47)
1:62
(0:39)
max[0;e¤ort 3]  1:45
(1:22)
 1:19
(0:80)
 1:61
(1:24)
max[0; 3 e¤ort] 4:36

(0:84)
5:38
(1:13)
4:34
(0:80)
period
0:19
(0:26)
 0:47
(0:25)
0:19
(0:26)
ASYM
7:23
(3:52)
ASYM * e¤ort deviation
 0:63
(0:59)
ASYM * max[0;e¤ort 3] 0:48
(1:45)
ASYM * max[0; 3 e¤ort] 0:97
(1:30)
ASYM * period
 0:67
(0:36)
constant
10:71
(2:71)
 3:58
(2:90)
 10:86
(2:59)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Punishment is censored at 0 and at the pre-punishment earnings of
Player J. ; ; signicant at 1%, 5%, 10% level; N = 200 (SYM and ASYM), 400 (pooled).
Table 2 presents the results from a regression analysis on the determinants of punishment. The
dependent variable is the number of punishment points that Player S assigned to Player J in period
t. Since punishment is censored at 0 and at the pre-punishment earnings of player J, we use a Tobit
regression. The independent variables are: e¤ort deviation the di¤erence between the suggestion
made by Player S and the e¤ort chosen by Player J; , e¤ort the level of e¤ort exerted by Player J
in period t, where we allow for asymmetric a¤ects for e¤orts higher than 3 and lower than 3; period
a variable controlling for possible time trends; for the pooled regression we also include ASYM
a treatment dummy taking the value of 1 if the observation comes from the ASYM treatment
and 0 otherwise. We also include the interaction of the above variables with the treatment dummy.
The empirical model controls for individual random e¤ects taking into account the fact that each
individual makes repeated decisions regarding punishment.
The most robust nding in all regressions of Table 2 is that disobeying Player S by choosing a
level of e¤ort below what was suggested is punished in both treatments (cf. the strongly signicant
coe¢ cients for e¤ort deviation). Another interesting nding is that, even when controlling for the
extent of disobedience, punishment is substantially and signicantly higher in ASYM than in SYM.
This can be seen by the sizable treatment dummy for ASYM. This suggests that participants in the
role of Player S use the asymmetric information to force Player J to exert higher levels of e¤ort. As
one would expect, the higher the level of e¤ort exerted by Player J the less is the punishment that
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is meted out. However, this e¤ect is only signicant for e¤ort levels below 3. The insignicance of
the interactions of the e¤ort variables and ASYM indicates that lower e¤ort is not punished more
in ASYM than in SYM.
Is coercion successful? Does Player J respond to punishment by increasing her e¤ort in the
following period? Table 3 presents the results from linear random e¤ects regressions analyzing the
determinants of e¤ort exerted by Player J. The dependent variable is the e¤ort exerted in period t.
The independent variables are Suggestion in t by Player S, Punishment in t   1, i.e., the number
of points Player S assigned to Player J in the previous period, and Period: All variables are used
as rst di¤erences. The results indicate that Player J responds strongly to the suggestion made by
Player S. In contrast to some of the recent literature (e.g. Bolle et al., 2011; Denant-Boemont et
al., 2007; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Nikiforakis, 2008), we nd no counter-productive e¤ect of
punishment. The e¤ect of past punishment is signicantly positive in all regressions, although its
magnitude is fairly small.
Table 3: What determines e¤ort? Random e¤ects regression
dependent variable: e¤ort in t SYM ASYM pooled
suggestion in t
0:38
(0:06)
0:30
(0:08)
0:38
(0:07)
punishment in t  1 0:06

(0:02)
0:05
(0:02)
0:06
(0:03)
period
0:00
(0:15)
0:01
(0:20)
0:00
(0:17)
ASYM
0:01
(0:24)
ASYM * suggestion in t
 0:08
(0:10)
ASYM * punishment in t  1  0:01
(0:03)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables in the regression were used as rst di¤erences. ; ;
signicant at 1%, 5%, 10% level; N = 160 (SYM and ASYM), 320 (pooled).
We next turn our attention to behavior in the second part of the experiment after roles are
reversed. In SYM, the role reversal does not reveal any new information about the payo¤s realized
by the senior subjects in periods 1-10. In contrast, in ASYM, junior subjects learn the extent to
which they have been exploited. We are interested to see to what extent behavior in periods 1-10
a¤ects outcomes in periods 11-20.
Result 5: Behavior in Part 2 is signicantly determined by the outcomes in Part 1 in ASYM.
There is a similar, but weaker, relationship in SYM.
SUPPORT: Figures 4 and 5 presents the relationship between e¤ort exerted by Player J in periods
1-10 and that exerted by Player S in periods 11-20. Each observation represents the average e¤ort
in a group in periods 1-10 and the average e¤ort in periods 11-20. The two lines represent the
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Figure 4: E¤ort in Parts 1 and 2 in treatment SYM
45-degree line and a tted regression line. As can be seen, there is a clear positive relationship
in ASYM. The relationship is weaker in SYM, although clearly e¤ort in the second part of the
experiment is still similar to that in the rst part in some groups. To assess the strength of the
relationship we ran an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the average e¤ort in periods
11-20. The independent variable is the average e¤ort in periods 1-10. The relationship is highly
signicant in ASYM (coe¢ cient: 0.68; p-value < 0:01), but not in SYM (coe¢ cient: 0.13; p-value
= 0:44).19 These ndings suggest that bygones are not bygones.
In order to understand behavior in Part 2 and how it relates to that in Part 1, we take a look
at the responses provided by individuals in the role of Player J in the norm questionnaire. The
answers illustrate that, in both treatments, those in the role of Player J consider an eye for an
eyeto be socially acceptable and two eyes for an eyeto be socially unacceptable. We also nd
that letting bygones be bygones is as socially acceptable as an eye for an eye. In particular,
individuals were asked three questions:
In part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an e¤ort level of 5. (Bob did not know how his e¤ort
will a¤ect Adams earnings ASYM only.) Bob chose an e¤ort level of 3. Adam reduced Bobs
earnings until nally Bob chose a level of 5. In Part 2, Bob asked Adam to choose an e¤ort level
of 5. How socially acceptable is Bobs demand?
In part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an e¤ort level of 5. (Bob did not know how his e¤ort
19One group in SYM appears to be an outlier with an average e¤ort close to 7 in the rst part and below 3 in the
second part. If we run the regression excluding this group, the relationship becomes signicant, although it is still
weaker than in ASYM (coe¢ cient: 0.53; p value = 0.03).
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Figure 5: E¤ort in Parts 1 and 2 in treatment ASYM
will a¤ect Adams earnings ASYM only.) Bob chose an e¤ort level of 3. Adam reduced Bobs
earnings until nally Bob chose a level of 5. In Part 2, Bob asked Adam to choose an e¤ort level
of 7 instead. How socially acceptable is Bobs demand?
In part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an e¤ort level of 5. (Bob did not know how his e¤ort
will a¤ect Adams earnings ASYM only.) Bob chose an e¤ort level of 5. Adam did not reduce
Bobs earnings. In Part 2, Bob asked Adam to choose an e¤ort level of 3 instead. How socially
acceptable is Bobs demand?
Again answers were coded as 1 for very socially acceptable, 2 for somewhat socially accept-
able, 3 for somewhat socially unacceptable, and 4 for very socially unacceptable. The average
rank for the rst question is 1.60 and 1.65 for SYM and ASYM, respectively. The average rank
for the second question is 3.10 and 3.05 for SYM and ASYM, respectively. The average rank for
the third question is 1.55 and 1.70 for SYM and ASYM, respectively. None of the three di¤er-
ences across treatments are statistically signicant using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test (p-values
> 0:65). The average rank is signicantly higher in the second question than in the rst question
using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test (p-value < 0:01 for both SYM and ASYM) suggesting that an
eye for an eyeis more socially acceptable than two eyes for an eye. Also, the average rank is sig-
nicantly lower in the third question than in the second question again using a two-tailed Wilcoxon
test (p-value < 0:01 for both SYM and ASYM) suggesting that letting bygones be bygones in the
absence of coercion is more socially acceptable than two eyes for an eye. However, the average
rank is not signicantly di¤erent in the rst and third questions using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test
(p-value > 0:74).
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Figure 6: Di¤erences in earnings before and after the role change
It is also interesting to examine the relationship between post-punishment earnings in the rst
and second part of the experiment. Post-punishment earnings reveal the extent of inequality be-
tween Player S and Player J, but also, given the evidence just presented on e¤ort, the extent of
punishment. Figure 6 plots the di¤erence in the average post-punishment earnings between Player
S and Player J in the rst and second part. The gure illustrates that Player S earns more than
Player J in both treatments in Part 1, while the opposite happens in Part 2. It also depicts that
the di¤erence in earnings is greater under asymmetric information. Finally, it reveals that the
outcomes in the rst part of the experiment are positively correlated with the outcomes in the
second part under asymmetric information. The relationship is again weaker in SYM. To assess
the strength of the relationship we ran an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the average
di¤erence in earnings in periods 11-20. The independent variable is the average e¤ort in periods
1-10. The relationship is highly signicant in ASYM (coe¢ cient: 0.75; p value < 0:01), but not in
SYM (coe¢ cient: 0.27; p-value = 0:15).
What makes these results interesting is the fact that subjects have symmetric information in
both treatments in the second part. Exploitation in the rst part clearly a¤ects outcomes in the
second part in ASYM. Nevertheless, e¤ort in the second part is not signicantly di¤erent across
treatments (Mann-Whitney, two-tailed, p-value = 0:83). Also, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the average e¤ort of 3.10 in SYM and 3.37 in ASYM is the same as the fair e¤ort level of 3
(Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, two-tailed, p-value > 0:46).
19
4 Conclusion
We have designed a game in which exploitation can result from the hierarchical relationship between
players and, in particular, from the fact that the senior worker has the power to coerce a junior
worker into exerting high levels of e¤ort. Using a laboratory experiment, we nd that senior
workers often attempt to exploit junior workers, asking them to exert high levels of e¤ort. This
occurs both when junior workers have complete information about how their e¤ort a¤ect the senior
workers earnings, and when they have incomplete information about how their e¤ort a¤ects the
earnings of the senior worker. These attempts, however, are more frequent and pronounced under
incomplete information. The evidence collected from an incentive-compatible questionnaire used
to elicit norms against exploitation suggests an explanation for this behavior: senior workers seem
to consider small levels of exploitation as socially acceptable when junior workers cannot detect
they are being exploited. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst empirical evidence that the
content of norms may depend on the information that individuals have at their disposal.
The attempts to exploit junior workers are unsuccessful under complete information. The
reason is that most junior workers disobey suggestions by senior workers to exert an e¤ort that
would imply unequal earnings for senior and junior workers, despite the threat of being punished.
Interestingly, junior workers disobey senior workers even when they have incomplete information.
This is presumably because they anticipate that senior workers will try to exploit their informational
advantage. The result is that, while exploitation is successful under asymmetric information, its
extent is small. Most senior workers attempt to coerce junior workers into exerting high levels
of e¤ort under both informational conditions by investing signicant amounts in punishing junior
workers when the latter show disobedience. The willingness to coerce junior workers is more
pronounced under asymmetric information. The result of exploitation and coercion is that junior
workers are substantially worse o¤ in monetary terms under asymmetric information than under
symmetric information.
What do our results imply for exploitation in organizations? As mentioned in the introduction,
our laboratory experiment controls for a number of factors that could a¤ect the willingness of
managers to exploit their subordinates in daily life. For this reason, generalizations should be made
with care. We believe our ndings suggest that exploitation may be more likely in organizations in
which workers have little information about the product of their e¤orts relative to their managers.
Greater transparency in these cases could limit the extent of exploitation, not only because workers
will be more likely to resist exploitation, but also because managers may be less willing to act in
a way that would be socially unacceptable. This may be either because individuals su¤er a cost
when they violate social norms or because socially unacceptable behavior could cost managers their
job.20
20For two experiments on the pro-social e¤ect of democratic or organizational control see Bolle and Vogel (2011)
and Hamman et al. (2011).
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Appendix 
    
    Table A.1 — Summary statistics from questionnaire in Part 3 
Questions SYM treatment ASYM treatment 
Mean Mode Mean Mode
 
1. Suppose in Part 1, Bob knows exactly how Adam's earnings depend 
on Bob's effort choice. Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 3. 
How socially acceptable is Adam's demand? 
1.05 
(0.22) 
1 1.23 
(0.42) 
1 
 
2. Suppose in Part 1, Bob knows exactly how Adam's earnings depend 
on Bob's effort choice. Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 5. 
How socially acceptable is Adam's demand? 
2.20 
(0.67) 
2 2.05 
(0.75) 
2 
 
3. Suppose in Part 1, Bob does NOT know how Adam's earnings 
depend on Bob's effort choice. Adam asked Bob to choose an effort 
level of 3. How socially acceptable is Adam's demand? 
Not 
asked 
Not 
asked 
1.38 
(0.63) 1 
 
4. Suppose in Part 1, Bob does NOT know how Adam's earnings 
depend on Bob's effort choice. Adam asked Bob to choose an effort 
level of 5. How socially acceptable is Adam's demand? 
Not 
asked 
Not 
asked 
1.53 
(0.60) 1 
 
5*. In Part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 5. Bob 
chose an effort level of 3. Adam reduced Bob's earnings until finally 
Bob chose a level of 5. In Part 2, Bob asked Adam to choose an effort 
level of 5. How socially acceptable is Bob's demand? 
1.55 
(0.75) 1 
1.57 
(0.78) 1 
6*. In Part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 5. Bob 
chose an effort level of 3. Adam reduced Bob's earnings until finally 
Bob chose a level of 5. In Part 2, Bob asked Adam to choose an effort 
level of 7 instead. How socially acceptable is Bob's demand? 
2.93 
(0.73) 
3 2.88 
(0.79) 
3 
7*. In Part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 3. Bob 
chose an effort level of 3. Adam did not reduce Bob's earnings. In Part 
2, Bob asked Adam to choose an effort level of 3. How socially 
acceptable is Bob's demand? 
1.05 
(0.22) 1 
1.15 
(0.53) 1 
 
8*. In Part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 3. Bob 
chose an effort level of 3. Adam did not reduce Bob's earnings. In Part 
2, Bob asked Adam to choose an effort level of 5 instead. How socially 
acceptable is Bob's demand? 
2.73 
(0.51) 
3 2.60 
(0.78) 
3 
 
9*. In Part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 3. Bob 
chose an effort level of 3. Adam did not reduce Bob's earnings. In Part 
2, Bob asked Adam to choose an effort level of 7 instead. How socially 
acceptable is Bob's demand? 
3.63 
(0.54) 4 
3.45 
(0.78) 4 
10*. In part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 5. Bob 
chose an effort level of 5. Adam did not reduce Bob's earnings. In Part 
2, Bob asked Adam to choose an effort level of 3 instead. How socially 
acceptable is Bob's demand? 
1.48 
(0.68) 1 
1.53 
(0.72) 1 
* In the case of the ASYM treatment, questions 5 to 10 had an addition of “Bob did NOT know how his effort 
will affect Adam’s   earnings” just after the second sentence. Numbers in parenthesis indicate standard deviation. 
Calculations are based on the responses of participants irrespective of their role in Part 1 of the experiment.  
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Experimental Instructions 
 
Below are the experimental instructions for the ASYM treatment. We first present the instructions for 
senior workers (Player A in the instructions) and then those for junior workers (Player B). The 
instructions for the SYM treatment were appropriately adjusted and are available from the authors 
upon request.   
 
General Instructions (for all players) 
 
When entering the laboratory you drew a number which determined your seat number. In turn, your 
seat number determines the type of decisions you will make in the experiment.  
 
As you will find out shortly, most participants will be allocated one of two roles (A or B). More 
information about the decisions of A and B will be given on a separate set of instructions.  
 
However, one participant will be assigned a role other than A or B. We will refer to this individual as 
‘the monitor’. This individual will not receive the other sets of instructions that the other participants 
will receive. The role of this individual is to pay each participant at the end of the experiment.  
 
The monitor will be the only one who ever will be informed about your earnings. Given that the 
monitor will not receive the other set of instructions, s/he will not be able to infer anything about your 
decisions in the experiment from your earnings. That is, no one except you will be able to tell what 
decisions you made during the experiment (not even the experimenters).  
 
The monitor will receive a payment for assisting us with the experiment.  
 
In today’s experiment, the individual who will have the role of the monitor is the one who drew 
number ‘30’. 
 
If you are the one with number 30, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to 
you. Otherwise, please proceed to read the other set of instructions.  
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Instructions for Player A 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please do not communicate with other 
participants during the experiment. Should you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of 
us will come to assist you. The amount of money you earn from this experiment depends on your 
decisions and those made by others in the experiment. It is therefore important that you take your time 
to understand the instructions. You may receive further instructions later. If you do, please read those 
also carefully. 
 
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in Experimental Monetary Units (EMU) where 
9 EMU = 1 Australian Dollar (AUD). All EMU earned during the experiment will be summed up, 
exchanged into AUD, and paid to you in cash in private immediately at the end of the experiment. No 
one except the participant selected to be the monitor will ever be informed about your earnings. Given 
that the monitor will not receive these instructions, s/he will not be able to infer anything about your 
decisions in the experiment from your earnings.  
 
There are two types of players in this experiment, which lasts 10 periods. We will refer to them as 
Player A and Player B. At the beginning of the experiment, you were randomly assigned the role of 
Player A. Roles will remain the same throughout the 10 periods. Player A and Player B differ in the 
decisions they can make.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will also randomly match you with another 
individual in the laboratory. Each participant will be matched with an individual that has been assigned 
the opposite role. That is, you will be matched with an individual that has been assigned the role of 
Player B. You will remain matched with the same individual throughout the 10 periods. You will 
never find out the identity of the other individual and the other individual will never find out your 
identity.   
 
Each of the 10 periods is divided into 3 stages. In what follows, we explain the decisions each type of 
player must take in each stage and how these decisions translate into earnings.  
 
Stage 1 
In stage 1, you (Player A) will indicate the level of effort that you would like Player B to choose 
in stage 2. There are eleven effort levels. The lowest effort level is 0 and the highest one is 10. You 
can ask Player B to select any effort level from 0 to 10.  
 
The higher the level of effort chosen by Player B in stage 2, the higher will be your earnings. So far, all 
of this is also known to Player B. The following information and that contained in the table “Your 
Earnings at the End of Stage 2”, however, is only known to you. In particular, you know that every 
additional unit of effort chosen by Player B will increase your earnings by 2 EMU. Your exact 
earnings at the end of the second stage are given in the following table.  
 
Your Earnings at the End of Stage 2 
Effort level 
chosen by B 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Your Earnings 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 
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Stage 2 
In stage 2, Player B will be informed about the level of effort that you would like Player B to 
choose. Player B must then choose an effort level. The effort level can be any effort level between 0 
and 10.  
 
The higher the level of effort chosen by Player B in stage 2, the lower will be his/her earnings. In 
particular, every additional unit of effort chosen by Player B will decrease his/her earnings by 2 EMU. 
The exact earnings of Player B at the end of the second stage are given in the following table.  
 
Player B’s Earnings at the End of Stage 2 
Effort level 
chosen by B 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Player B’s 
Earnings  24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 
 
Remember that Player B does not know exactly how his/her choice of an effort level affects your 
earnings. However, Player B knows the exact information included in table “Player B’s Earnings at the 
End of  Stage 2” and s/he also knows that you have the information included in the table.  
 
For example, if Player B chooses an effort level of 6, s/he knows that his/her earnings at the end of 
stage 2 will be 12. Player B knows that you know this too. Yet Player B does not know how much 
exactly you will earn. But s/he knows that your earnings are increasing as effort increases. 
 
Stage 3 
In stage 3, you must decide whether to reduce the earnings of Player B or simply leave them 
unchanged. In particular, you will be asked to state by how much you would like to reduce player B’s 
earnings. If you do not wish to reduce the earnings of Player B, then you must choose ‘0 EMU’. 
Otherwise, you must specify the number of EMU by which you would like to reduce Player B’s 
earnings. You cannot reduce Player B’s earnings below 0.  
 
Every 1 EMU that you reduce Player B’s earnings, will reduce your earnings by 0.20 EMU.  This 
is known to Player B  when making decisions in Stage 2. In particular, Player B has the same 
information as you do regarding Stage 3.  
 
The earnings of each player at the end of a period will be calculated as follows: 
 
Your Earnings at the end of a period =  
Earnings at the end of Stage 2 – 0.20*(Number of EMU by which Player B’s earnings were reduced) 
Or  
12+2*(Effort Level Chosen by Player B) – 0.20*(Number of EMU by which Player B’s earnings were 
reduced) 
 
Earnings of Player B at the end of a period =  
Earnings at the end of Stage 2 – (Number of EMU by which Player B’s earnings were reduced by you) 
Or  
24 - 2*(Effort Level Chosen by Player B) – (Number of EMU by which Player B’s earnings were 
reduced by you) 
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Remember that there will be 10 periods and that you will always interact with the same individual. 
Also, remember that roles will remain the same across periods. For the first two periods you will be 
given 60 seconds to make each decision. Thereafter, you will be given 45 seconds for each decision. 
 
Below are two examples to help you understand the experiment. The examples are not meant as a 
guide for behaviour in the experiment. 
 
Example 1 
Assume that in stage 1 you ask Player B to choose an effort level of 7. In stage 2, Player B chose an 
effort level of 5. Assume further that you decided to reduce Player B’s earnings by 10 EMU. Your 
earnings at the end of this period will be 
 
12 + 2*(5) – 0.20*(10) = 20.00 EMU 
 
 
Example 2 
Assume that in stage 1 you ask Player B to choose an effort level of 2. Assume that in stage 2 Player B 
chose an effort level of 2. Assume further that you decided to reduce Player B’s earnings by 5 EMU. 
Your earnings at the end of this period will be 
 
12 + 2*(2) – 0.20*(5) = 15.00 EMU 
 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand to attract the attention of one of the experimenters. 
Otherwise, please proceed to answer the questions on the following page. Once you have finished 
answering the questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to check your 
answer.  
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Control Questions 
 
1. True or false: In stage 2 Player B has to choose the level of effort asked by you. 
  
  True    False 
 
2. True or false: In stage 3 you can reduce B’s earnings to 0.  
  
  True    False 
 
3. True or false: The effort level asked by you in stage 1 determines your earnings.  
  
  True    False 
 
4. True or false: Player B knows exactly how much you will earn when s/he chooses an effort level. 
 
  True    False 
 
5. True or false: Player B knows the exact implications of earnings reduction in stage 3 for his/her and 
your earnings.  
 
  True    False 
 
6. True or false: No one (not even the monitor) will be able to identify the decisions I made in the 
experiment.  
 
  True    False 
 
7. What will be your earnings if Player B chooses an effort level of 3 and you do not reduce B’s 
earnings?  
 
Your earnings _____________ 
 
8. What will be your earnings if Player B chooses an effort level of 3 and you reduce B’s earnings by 5 
EMU?  
 
Your earnings _____________ 
 
9. What will be your earnings if Player B chooses an effort level of 8 and you do not reduce B’s 
earnings?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
 
10. What will be your earnings if Player B chooses an effort level of 8 and you reduce B’s earnings by 
5 EMU?  
 
Your earnings _____________ 
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Instructions for Player A - Part 2 
 
This is the second part of the experiment. Any earnings from Part 2 will be added to your earnings 
from Part 1.  
 
In the second part, you will continue to interact with the same person as in the first part. The task 
in the second part is the same as that in the first part. The second part also lasts 10 periods. You 
are still Player A. 
 
There is one important difference between the first and the second part: The decisions that Players A 
and B have to make will be exactly reversed. In particular, Player B will now be the one asking you 
(Player A) what level of effort to choose in stage 2, and whether or not to reduce your earnings in stage 
3. You will be the one choosing an effort level in stage 2 from 0 to 10.   
 
Player B’s earnings are calculated in the same way as your earnings in Part 1. Similarly, your earnings 
are calculated in the same way as Player B’s earnings in Part 1.  
 
In contrast to Part 1, now both players have precise information about the earnings of each other. 
 
In particular, every additional unit of effort you choose will increase Player B’s earnings by 2 EMU. 
The exact earnings of Player B at the end of the second stage are given in the following table.  
 
Player B’s Earnings at the End of Stage 2 
Effort level 
chosen by you 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Player B’s 
Earnings  12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 
 
 
Furthermore, the higher the level of effort you choose in stage 2, the lower will be your earnings. In 
particular, every additional unit of effort chosen by you will decrease your earnings by 2 EMU. Your 
exact earnings at the end of the second stage are given in the following table.  
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Your Earnings at the End of Stage 2 
Effort level 
chosen by you 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Your Earnings 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 
 
To summarize: 
 
Earnings of Player B at the end of a period =  
12+2*(Effort Level Chosen by you) – 0.20*(Number of EMU by which your earnings were reduced) 
 
Your Earnings at the end of a period =  
24 - 2*(Effort Level Chosen by you) – (Number of EMU by which your earnings were reduced by 
Player B) 
 
For the first two periods you will be given 60 seconds to make each decision. Thereafter, you will be 
given 45 seconds for each decision. 
 
Important Note:  
There will also be a third and final part. The task in Part 3 will be different to that in Parts 1 and 2. In 
Part 3, you will be asked to make different decisions and, most importantly, you will NOT be matched 
with one particular individual.  
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand to attract the attention of one of the experimenters. 
Otherwise, please proceed to answer the questions on the following page. Once you have finished 
answering the questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to check your 
answer.  
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Control Questions 
 
1. True or false: The decisions and the earnings of Player B in Part 2 are the same as yours in Part 1.  
 
  True    False 
 
 
2. True or false: I will be matched with a different person in Part 2 than I was in Part 1.  
 
  True    False 
 
3. True or false: The task in Part 3 is different to that in Parts 1 and 2, and I will not be matched with 
the same individual as in Parts 1 and 2.  
 
  True    False 
 
4. What will be your earnings if you choose an effort level of 8 and Player B does not reduce your 
earnings?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
 
5. What will be your earnings if you choose an effort level of 8 and Player B reduces your earnings by 
5 EMU?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
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Instructions (for both Player A and B) - Part 3 
 
This is the third and final part of the experiment. After this part is over you will be asked to fill in a 
brief questionnaire while the participant randomly selected to be the monitor will be preparing your 
payments.  
 
As explained previously, the task in this part is different from that in Parts 1 and 2. The instructions are 
the same for all participants.  
 
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to characterize the decisions of an individual that we 
will call ‘Bob’. Bob is matched with an individual that we will call ‘Adam’.  Note that Adam and Bob 
are not real people and the decisions ascribed to them are not that of any particular individual.  
 
Adam is assigned the role of Player A and Bob is assigned the role of Player B in Part 1 of the 
experiment. Adam has no knowledge of the content of Part 2 when asking Bob to choose a level of 
effort. Adam can reduce Bob’s earnings after observing Bob’s choice if he desires. The earnings 
consequences of choosing a particular level of effort are the same as in Parts 1 and 2. 
 
Your task in this part will be to characterize Adam’s or Bob’s decisions in 10 different scenarios.  
 
Adam’s or Bob’s decisions can be characterized as “socially acceptable” or “socially unacceptable” 
By socially acceptable, we mean decisions that most people in this room would consider acceptable. A 
decision would be socially unacceptable if most people in this room would consider it unacceptable.  
 
Example: In Part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of X. Bob chose a lower effort level 
than X. After Adam reduced Bob’s earnings a few times, Bob decided to choose an effort level of X as 
asked. In Part 2, Bob asked Adam to choose an effort level of Y. Do you think Bob’s request in the 
Part 2 is (i) very socially acceptable, (ii) somewhat socially acceptable, (iii) somewhat socially 
unacceptable, and (iv) very socially unacceptable? 
 
You will also be asked to characterize Adam’s requests in Part 1. You will be asked to do this in cases 
when Bob knew how his effort affected Adam’s earnings and when Bob did not know.  
 
How are payments determined in Part 3? 
In this part, you will be presented with 10 scenarios involving Adam’s and Bob’s decisions. In each 
scenario, you need to characterize Adam’s or Bob’s decisions. At the end of this part, the computer 
will randomly select one of the 10 scenarios.  
 
If your characterization in the randomly selected scenario is the same as the characterization given by 
most participants in today’s session, you will earn 5 AUD (that is, 45 EMU). This amount will be 
added to your earnings from Parts 1 and 2, and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. In 
other words, if your characterization coincides with the most common characterization, you will 
receive 5 AUD. If your characterization is different from the most common characterization, your 
earnings from this part of the experiment will be 0.  
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Example: Assume that 12 people characterized Bob’s request in the Part 2 as “very socially 
acceptable”, 11 people characterized it as “somewhat socially acceptable”, and no one characterized 
Bob’s request as “somewhat socially unacceptable” or “very socially unacceptable”. If you 
characterized Bob’s request as “very socially acceptable”, 13 people will have given this 
characterization. As this is the most common characterization, you will earn 5 AUD. If you 
characterized Bob’s request as “somewhat socially acceptable”, 12 people will have given this 
characterization. In this case, there are two equally common characterizations. As your 
characterization is one of the most common, you will earn 5 AUD. If, however, you characterized 
Bob’s request as “somewhat socially unacceptable” or “very socially unacceptable” then the most 
common characterization (very socially acceptable) would be different to yours and, therefore your 
earnings would be 0 AUD.   
 
To summarize, in this part you will be asked to characterize the decisions of an individual in 10 
different scenarios. At the end of Part 3, the computer will randomly select one of the 10 scenarios. If 
your characterization in the randomly selected scenario coincides with the most common 
characterization amongst all participants in today’s session you will receive 5 AUD. Otherwise, your 
earnings from this part of the experiment will be 0. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you.  
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Instructions for Player B 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please do not communicate with other 
participants during the experiment. Should you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of 
us will come to assist you. The amount of money you earn from this experiment depends on your 
decisions and those made by others in the experiment. It is therefore important that you take your time 
to understand the instructions. You may receive further instructions later. If you do, please read those 
also carefully. 
 
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in Experimental Monetary Units (EMU) where 
9 EMU = 1 Australian Dollar (AUD). All EMU earned during the experiment will be summed up, 
exchanged into AUD, and paid to you in cash in private immediately at the end of the experiment. No 
one except the participant selected to be the monitor will ever be ever informed about your earnings. 
Given that the monitor will not receive these instructions, s/he will not be able to infer anything about 
your decisions in the experiment from your earnings.  
 
 
There are two types of players in this experiment, which lasts 10 periods. We will refer to them as 
Player A and Player B. At the beginning of the experiment, you were randomly assigned the role of 
Player B. Roles will remain the same throughout the 10 periods. Player A and Player B differ in the 
decisions they can make.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will also randomly match you with another 
individual in the laboratory. Each participant will be matched with an individual that has been assigned 
the opposite role. That is, you will be matched with an individual that has been assigned the role of 
Player A. You will remain matched with the same individual throughout the 10 periods. You will 
never find out the identity of the other individual and the other individual will never find out your 
identity.   
 
Each of the 10 periods is divided into 3 stages. In what follows, we explain the decisions each type of 
player must take in each stage and how these decisions translate into earnings.  
 
Stage 1 
In stage 1, Player A will indicate the level of effort that s/he would like you (Player B) to choose 
in stage 2. There are eleven effort levels. The lowest effort level is 0 and the highest one is 10. Player 
A can ask you to select any effort level from 0 to 10.  
 
The higher the level of effort you choose in stage 2, the higher will be the earnings of Player A. While 
you will not know the exact earnings of Player A, Player A knows exactly the implications of your 
choice for his/her earnings.  
 
Stage 2 
In stage 2, you will be informed about the level of effort that Player A would like you to choose. 
You must then choose an effort level. The effort level can be any effort level between 0 and 10.  
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The higher the level of effort you choose in stage 2, the lower will be your earnings. In particular, 
every additional unit of effort you choose will decrease your earnings by 2 EMU. Your exact earnings 
at the end of the second stage are given in the following table.  
 
 
Effort level 
chosen by you 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Your Earnings 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 
 
The information about your earnings is also available to Player A. Remember, however, that you have 
not been given precise information about Player A’s earnings (apart from the fact that they are 
increasing in the effort chosen by you). 
 
For example, if you choose an effort level of 6, your earnings at the end of stage 2 will be 12. Player A 
knows this too. However, you do not know how much exactly Player A will earn. Player A knows 
exactly how much s/he will earn if you choose an effort of 6.  
 
Stage 3 
In stage 3, Player A must decide whether to reduce your earnings or simply leave them 
unchanged. In particular, Player A will be asked to state by how much s/he would like to reduce your 
earnings. If Player A does not wish to reduce your earnings, then s/he must choose ‘0 EMU’. 
Otherwise, Player A must specify the number of EMU by which s/he would like to reduce your 
earnings. Player A cannot reduce your earnings below 0.  
 
Every 1 EMU that Player A reduces your earnings, will reduce Player A’s earnings by 0.20 
EMU. This is known to Player A when making decisions in Stages 1 and 3.  
 
Your earnings at the end of a period will be calculated as follows:  
 
Your earnings at the end of a period =  
Earnings at the end of Stage 2 – (Number of EMU by which your earnings were reduced by Player A) 
Or  
24 - 2*(Effort Level Chosen by you) – (Number of EMU by which your earnings were reduced by 
Player A) 
 
Remember that there will be 10 periods and that you will always interact with the same individual. 
Also, remember that roles will remain the same across periods. For the first two periods you will be 
given 60 seconds to make each decision. Thereafter, you will be given 45 seconds for each decision. 
 
Below are two examples to help you understand the experiment. The examples are not meant as a 
guide for behaviour in the experiment. 
 
Example 1 
Assume that in stage 1 Player A asks you to choose an effort level of 7. In stage 2, you chose an effort 
level of 5. Assume further that Player A decided to reduce your earnings by 10 EMU. Your earnings at 
the end of this period will be 
 
 24  –  2*(5) – 10 = 4.00 EMU 
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Example 2 
Assume that in stage 1 Player A asks you to choose an effort level of 2. Assume that in stage 2 you 
chose an effort level of 2. Assume further that Player A decided to reduce your earnings by 5 EMU. 
Your earnings at the end of this period will be 
 
24  –  2*(2) – 5 = 15.00 EMU 
 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand to attract the attention of one of the experimenters. 
Otherwise, please proceed to answer the questions on the following page. Once you have finished 
answering the questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to check your 
answer.  
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Control Questions 
 
1. True or false: In stage 2 you have to choose the level of effort asked by Player A. 
  
  True    False 
 
2. True or false: In stage 3 Player A can reduce your earnings to 0.  
  
  True    False 
 
3. True or false: The effort level asked by Player A in stage 1 determines his/her earnings.  
  
  True    False 
 
4. True or false: You know exactly how much Player A will earn when you choose an effort level. 
 
  True    False 
 
5. True or false: Player A knows exactly how much s/he will earn when you choose an effort level and 
also knows how much you will earn. 
 
  True    False 
 
6. True or false: No one (not even the monitor) will be able to identify the decisions I made in the 
experiment.  
 
  True    False 
 
7. What will be your earnings if you choose an effort level of 3 and Player A does not reduce your 
earnings?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
 
8. What will be your earnings  if you choose an effort level of 3 and Player A reduces your earnings by 
5 EMU?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
 
9. What will be your earnings if you choose an effort level of 8 and Player A does not reduce your 
earnings?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
 
10. What will be your earnings if you choose an effort level of 8 and Player A reduces your earnings 
by 5 EMU?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
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Instructions for Player B - Part 2 
 
This is the second part of the experiment. Any earnings from Part 2 will be added to your earnings 
from Part 1.  
 
In the second part, you will continue to interact with the same person as in the first part. The task 
in the second part is the same as that in the first part. The second part also lasts 10 periods. You 
are still Player B. 
 
There is one important difference between the first and the second part: The decisions that Players A 
and B have to make will be exactly reversed. In particular, you will now be the one asking Player A 
what level of effort to choose in stage 2, and whether or not to reduce the earnings of Player A in stage 
3. Player A will be the one choosing an effort level in stage 2 from 0 to 10.   
 
Your earnings are calculated in the same way as Player A’s earnings in Part 1. Similarly, Player A’s 
earnings are calculated in the same way as your earnings in Part 1.  
 
In contrast to Part 1, now both players have precise information about the earnings of each other. 
 
In particular, every additional unit of effort chosen by Player A will increase your earnings by 2 EMU. 
Your exact earnings at the end of the second stage are given in the following table.  
 
Your Earnings at the End of Stage 2 
Effort level 
chosen by A 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Your Earnings 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 
 
 
Furthermore, the higher the level of effort chosen by Player A in stage 2, the lower will be his/her 
earnings. In particular, every additional unit of effort chosen by Player A will decrease his/her earnings 
by 2 EMU. The exact earnings of Player A at the end of the second stage are given in the following 
table.  
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Player A’s Earnings at the End of Stage 2 
Effort level 
chosen by A 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Player A’s 
Earnings  24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 
 
To summarize: 
 
Your Earnings at the end of a period =  
12+2*(Effort Level Chosen by Player A) – 0.20*(Number of EMU by which Player A’s earnings were 
reduced by you) 
Earnings of Player A at the end of a period =  
24 - 2*(Effort Level Chosen by Player A) – (Number of EMU by which Player A’s earnings were 
reduced by you) 
 
For the first two periods you will be given 60 seconds to make each decision. Thereafter, you will be 
given 45 seconds for each decision. 
 
Important Note:  
There will also be a third and final part. The task in Part 3 will be different to that in Parts 1 and 2. In 
Part 3, you will be asked to make different decisions and, most importantly, you will NOT be matched 
with one particular individual.  
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand to attract the attention of one of the experimenters. 
Otherwise, please proceed to answer the questions on the following page. Once you have finished 
answering the questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to check your 
answer.  
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Control Questions 
 
1. True or false: The decisions and the earnings of Player A in Part 1 are the same as yours in Part 2.  
 
  True    False 
 
 
2. True or false: I will be matched with a different person in Part 2 than in I was in Part 1.  
 
  True    False 
 
3. True or false: The task in Part 3 is different to that in Parts 1 and 2, and I will not be matched with 
the same individual as in Parts 1 and 2.  
 
  True    False 
 
4. What will be your earnings if Player A chooses an effort level of 8 and you do not reduce A’s 
earnings?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
 
5. What will be your earnings if Player A chooses an effort level of 8 and you reduce A’s earnings by 5 
EMU?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
 
